“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests by Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Kim, Sang-Hyun
Accepted Manuscript
“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests
Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Sang-Hyun Kim
PII: S0899-8256(17)30096-9
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012
Reference: YGAME 2695
To appear in: Games and Economic Behavior
Received date: 28 September 2015
Please cite this article in press as: Chowdhury, S.M., Kim, S.-H. “Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner
contests. Games Econ. Behav. (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing
this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is
published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all
legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the Optimal
Design of Multi-winner Contests ∗
Subhasish M. Chowdhury† and Sang-Hyun Kim‡
This version: April 2017
Abstract
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1 Introduction
Contests, in which players exert costly and irreversible eﬀorts to win a prize, are ubiquitous
in day-to-day life. In cases such as war, terrorism or territorial conﬂicts, contests are not
designed by an organizer. However, there are very many situations including sports, patent
race, promotion tournament, crowd sourcing, legal battle etc. in which an organizer organizes
the contest, and contest design issues become highly important. The topic of optimal contest
design, hence, has been an active area of research. In the literature one of the most frequently
attempted questions is how to maximize the total eﬀort exerted in a contest. For a contest
with noisy outcome it is a further important question whether arranging a grand contest
elicits a higher equilibrium eﬀort than arranging several sub-contests.
For a single-winner setting, Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006) show that under certain
conditions a grand contest indeed elicits higher eﬀort. Adding an important contribution to
this area, Fu and Lu (2009) characterize the optimal structure for multi-winner contests.1
They employ a nested winner-selection procedure as in Clark and Riis (1996) and show that
a grand contest elicits greater equilibrium eﬀorts than what a collection of mutually exclusive
and exhaustive sub-contests does. This is an important ﬁnding since this extends the single-
winner contest results of Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006) into multi-winner settings, and
provides with clear policy design prescriptions.
In the speciﬁc mechanism employed above, the winners are selected sequentially. Players
simultaneously exert their eﬀort, and K winners are selected by K consecutive draws. Once
a winner is selected through a Tullock (1980) contest success function, he/she is immediately
removed from the pool of candidates up for the next draw. This procedure is repeated until
all the prizes are exhausted.
In the ﬁeld, however, the winner-selection procedure in a multi-winner contest is not
always the one suggested above. Clark and Riis (1996) mention that when “the imperfectly
discriminating rent-seeking contest [...] ha(s) several winners, there is no unique method
for selecting those winners”. Indeed, the very ﬁrst winner-selection mechanism suggested
in the multi-winner contest literature is by Berry (1993), who considers a one-shot winner-
selection mechanism. Under this, the players exert eﬀort and the set of winners are taken
1In these contests there are multiple prizes, but a contestant can win at most one prize.
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out simultaneously. The probability of a player to win one of K prizes is the sum of eﬀorts
exerted by any combination of a K-player group that includes that speciﬁc player, divided
by the sum of eﬀorts exerted by any combination of a K-player group. There are diﬀerent
instances in which either a simultaneous (Berry, 1993) or a sequential (Clark and Riis, 1996)
winner-selection mechanism is employed in the ﬁeld.
There are both pros and cons of employing the simultaneous mechanism. Clark and
Riis (1996) show that with this mechanism the very ﬁrst prize is allocated according to the
eﬀort outlays whereas all the other prizes are implicitly allocated randomly - allowing for an
incentive to free-ride. Chowdhury and Kim (2014), on the other hand, ﬁnd an equivalence
of the simultaneous mechanism to a mechanism in which the losers are sequentially taken
out - essentially providing a microfoundation for the contest success function arising out of
the simultaneous mechanism.2 Since the loser-elimination mechanism is well implemented in
real life, this helps one to reformulate those real life situations as well. Hence, it is important
to understand whether the answer to the original question (of comparing grand contest with
sub-contests) depends on the particular winner-selection mechanism implemented.
In this study we reconsider such comparison of a grand contest with a collection of
mutually exclusive and exhaustive sub-contests from a design point of view. We employ the
simultaneous winner-selection mechanism (Berry, 1993) and ﬁnd that the result of Fu and
Lu (2009) gets reversed, i.e., a collection of sub-contests elicit a higher level of equilibrium
eﬀort than what a grand multi-winner contest does. In such a situation we characterize the
optimal allocation of players and prizes for the case with identical prizes. We further show
that with the sequential loser-elimination mechanism (Chowdhury and Kim, 2014) the Fu
and Lu (2009) result is again reversed. We then characterize the optimal contest structure
when the number of sub-contests is limited to two and no prize can be wasted.
2Moreover, Chowdhury and Kovenock (2012) ﬁnd eﬀort equivalence between the simultaneous mechanism
and a situation in which the players in a multi-winner contest are connected by a ring network. de Palma
and Munshi (2013) ﬁnd that the simultaneous mechanism has a probabilistic foundation.
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2 Model and main result
2.1 Contest design under simultaneous winner-selection
Consider N identical players competing for K indivisible prizes with N > K ≥ 2. The
common values of the prizes are v1, v2, ..., vK , and a player can win at most one prize.
Without any loss of generality, assume that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vK . The contest designer
can run the grand contest by putting all the players and the prizes together or run M
small contests by dividing the contestants and the prizes into mutually exclusive groups.
Let ng be the number of contestants in group g and vg = (v
g
1 , v
g
2 , ..., v
g
kg
) be the vector of
values of prizes allocated to group g where kg be the number of prizes in group g, and
vg1 ≥ vg2 ≥ ... ≥ vgkg . We also deﬁne a collection of contests C = {cg}Mg=1 of which entry is
cg = {ng,vg}. Since the groups are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, given the sets of
contestants and of prizes, collection C deﬁnes a contest structure. Therefore,
∑M
g=1 ng = N
and
∑M
g=1 |vg| =
∑M
g=1 kg = K where |vg| is the number of elements in vector vg. We allow
both a contest without a prize (kg = 0 but ng > 0) and that without a player (kg > 0 but
ng = 0). In other words, the designer can throw prizes or players away. Throughout the
paper, we assume linear cost function with unit marginal cost.
Let us ﬁrst consider the problem of player i who is allocated to group g with kg ≥ 1.
Berry (1993) proposes a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism according to which the
probability of a player to win a prize is the sum of eﬀorts expended by any combination of
kg players that includes the speciﬁed player, divided by the sum of eﬀorts expended by any
combination of kg players. Hence, when ng > kg, the probability that player i wins a prize
is:
P SMi (x) =
(ng−1kg−1)times︷ ︸︸ ︷
kg−1∑
j=1
xj + xi +
kg∑
j=1,j =2
xj + xi + · · ·+
ng−1∑
j=ng−kg+1
xj + xi
kg∑
j=1
xj +
kg+1∑
j=1,j =2
xj + · · ·+
ng∑
j=ng−kg+1
xj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ngkg)times
where x is a vector of eﬀorts, and xi is the eﬀort of player i. If every player in the group
other than player i expends the same amount of eﬀort x−i, the contest success function of
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the simultaneous winner-selection mechanism boils down to:
P SMi (xi, x−i) = min
{
(kg − 1)x−i + xi
(ng − 1)x−i + xi , 1
}
In his original paper, Berry considers only the case with identical prizes. Here, we assume
that when prizes are heterogeneous, the prizes allocated to contest cg are randomly assigned
to the winners in cg. Letting v
g denote the expected value of the prize,
(∑kg
j=1 v
g
j
)
/kg, we
can write the objective function of player i as
πi(xi, x−i|ng,vg) = vgP SMi (xi, x−i)− xi,
thus the symmetric equilibrium eﬀort is
xSMg (ng,vg) =
⎧⎨
⎩ v
g (ng − kg) /n2g if ng ≥ kg ≥ 1
0 otherwise
. (1)
Let T SM(C) denote the total equilibrium eﬀort with the simultaneous winner-selection mech-
anism, i.e.,
T SM(C) =
M∑
g=1
ng × xSMg (2)
The following proposition states that the grand contest in which all the prizes and the players
are put never maximizes the total eﬀort if the simultaneous winner-selection mechanism is
implemented.
Proposition 1 Suppose the simultaneous winner-selection mechanism is employed. Then,
the sum of the eﬀorts elicited in a contest increases as the least-valued prize gets excluded
from the list. Thus, in the optimal contest structure, a single prize is given to each group.
Proof. It is clear from (1) that xSMg increases as kg decreases if ng ≥ kg. Suppose that we
throw away the least valued prize from a contest with kg ≥ 2, and let vgnew denote the new
expected value of the prize in the contest. Then vgnew ≥ vg, and the eﬀort elicited by the
new contest is
vgnew (ng − kg + 1)
ng
>
vg (ng − kg)
ng
= the eﬀort from the old contest cg.
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To characterize the optimal structure further, let us assume, following Berry (1993), that
the prizes are identical (i.e., v1 = v2 = ... = vK = v), and deﬁne K = min {K, N/2} where
N/2 is the largest integer not greater than N/2. Then we can show that with identical
prizes, the total equilibrium eﬀort is maximized by a symmetric structure.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the prizes are identical and that the simultaneous winner-
selection mechanism is implemented. In the optimal structure, K prizes are used, and N
players are divided as symmetrically as possible into K groups.
Proof. Proposition 1 shows that in order to maximize the total eﬀort, for any competitive
sub-contest, that is, one with ng > kg, kg must be 1. In such a sub-contest, the elicited
equilibrium eﬀort is
e(ng) =
(ng − 1)
ng
v.
Notice that e(ng) is increasing and concave in ng, from which we infer the following. First,
throwing away a player reduces the total eﬀort because e(ng) is increasing in ng, which
implies that in the optimal structure the number of players who are in the competitive
contests is N . Second, if we ignore the integer problem, then due to the concavity of e(ng),
the total eﬀort
∑
v(ng − 1)/ng is maximized when ni = nj for all i, j.
To show that exactly K must be used in the optimal structure, let us again ignore the
integer problem. Suppose k(≤ K) prizes are used and K − k are thrown away. When N
players are symmetrically allocated to k contests, ng = N/k for all g, and the total eﬀort is
k∑
g=1
(ng − 1)v
ng
= k
(N/k − 1)v
N/k
= (N − k)k v
N
which is maximized when k = N/2. Therefore, exactly K prizes are used in the optimal
structure.
When the prizes are identical, it is optimal to run as many symmetric sub-contests as
possible. If the prizes are heterogeneous, however, it may be optimal to make more players
compete for a more valuable prize for which each player is willing to expend more eﬀort. To
see this in a clearer manner, let us consider four players (N = 4) competing for two diﬀerent
prizes, 1 and 2 (K = 2), with values v1 ≥ v2. Because according to (1), ngxSMg , the eﬀort
elicited by contest cg, increases in ng, allocating a player to a contest without a prize (i.e.,
6
excluding a player) is never optimal. And we know that the grand contest does not maximize
the total eﬀort. Therefore, we only need to consider how to allocate the four players to two
contests each of which has a single prize.
If the players are symmetrically allocated to the two contests (“2-2” structure), each
of them is the standard Tullock contest. Therefore, the equilibrium eﬀort of a player who
competes for prize k(= 1, 2) is vk/4, and the total eﬀort is T
2-2 = (v1 + v2) /2. If, on the
other hand, all four of them compete for the more valuable prize (“4-0” structure), according
to (1), the total eﬀort is T 4-0 = 3v1/4.
3 Thus, if the prizes are suﬃciently heterogeneous
(more precisely if v1 > 2v2), the most asymmetric contest structure, in which the low value
prize is excluded, maximizes the total eﬀort.
2.2 Sequential loser-elimination mechanism
In the previous subsection we examined whether the optimality of the grand contest re-
mains valid if the simultaneous winner-selection mechanism is employed. Here we consider
a sequential loser-elimination mechanism (Chowdhury and Kim, 2014). According to this
mechanism, the players expend eﬀort, then one player is selected as a loser, i.e., ng−1 players
are selected as winners using Berry’s (1993) contest success function. Then that player and
his eﬀort are taken out of the calculation, another contest is run among the remaining ng−1
players using their already expended eﬀort, and another loser is taken out. After ng − kg
losers are taken out, the least-valued prize is given to the next “loser”, and this procedure
is repeated until all the prizes are distributed.
Formally, let Ωk denote a set of ng − (k− 1) players. In the loser-elimination mechanism,
conditional on that player i is in Ωk, the probability that player i is selected in the k
th draw
is
qi(x|Ωk) = X(Ωk)− xi∑
j∈Ωk (X(Ωk)− xj)
=
X(Ωk)− xi
(ng − k)X(Ωk)
where X(Ωk) is the sum of the eﬀorts exerted by the players in Ωk. This is the probability
that, according to Berry (1993), player i is not in a group of ng−k players when the number
of contestants is ng − k + 1. When the number of players is ng and that of prizes is kg, the
3Structure “3-1” (making only three players compete for prize 1) is dominated by structure “4-0” in terms
of the total elicited eﬀort because in structure “3-1” one player is wasted.
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probability that player i wins a prize can be written as
PLEi (x) =
∑
∀Ωkg
[
Pr
(
Ωkg
)
I
(
i ∈ Ωkg
)
(1− qi(x|Ωkg))
]
.
where Pr (Ωk) is the probability that the set of the remaining contestants for the k
th draw
is Ωk, and I (i ∈ Ωk) is the indicator function that takes value 1 if i ∈ Ωk and 0 otherwise.
Chowdhury and Kim (2014) show that if everyone but player i expends the same amount
of eﬀort x−i, then the probability for i to win a prize under this mechanism is:
PLEi (xi, x−i) = min
{
(kg − 1)x−i + xi
(ng − 1)x−i + xi , 1
}
Provided that ng > kg, after ng − kg losers are eliminated, the one who will get the lowest-
value prize is drawn and eliminated from the pool. This repeats until only one player is left
in the pool. Therefore, the expected payoﬀ without the eﬀort cost for player i in contest cg
is:
(kg − 1)x−i + xi
(ng − 1)x−i + xi
[
vgkg +
(kg − 2)x−i + xi
(kg − 1)x−i + xi
[(
vgkg−1 − vgkg
)
+ ...+
xi
x−i + xi
(vg1 − vg2)
]]
=
(kg − 1)x−i + xi
(ng − 1)x−i + xi v
g
kg
+
(kg − 2)x−i + xi
(ng − 1)x−i + xi
(
vgkg−1 − vgkg
)
+ ...+
xi
(ng − 1)x−i + xi (v
g
1 − vg2)
=
(∑kg
l=2 v
g
l
)
x−i + v
g
1xi
(ng − 1)x−i + xi
from which the symmetric equilibrium eﬀort with the loser-elimination mechanism is derived
as
xLEg (ng,vg) =
⎧⎨
⎩ v
g
1/ng −
(∑kg
l=1 v
g
l
)
/ (ng)
2 if ng > kg ≥ 1
0 otherwise
(3)
where kg = min{k < kg|vgk > vgk+1} if not all the prizes in contest cg are identical, and
kg = kg if the prizes are identical. In words, ng > kg means that the (more valuable) prizes
are not enough to be shared by everybody, so the players have to compete. Thus, when a
contest structure C is given, the total equilibrium eﬀort is
TLE =
M∑
g=1
ng × xLEg (ng,vg).
The following proposition states that the grand contest never maximizes the total eﬀort if
the sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented.
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Proposition 3 Suppose the sequential loser-elimination mechanism is employed. Then, the
sum of the eﬀorts elicited in a group increases as the least-valued prize is excluded from the
list. Thus, in the optimal contest structure, a single prize is given to each group.
Proof. It is clear from (3) that xLEg increases as we keep throwing away the least valued prize
provided that ng ≥ kg. This does not aﬀect the eﬀorts elicited from the other sub-contests.
Thus, the total eﬀort increases.
Just as Proposition 1, this proposition shows that in the optimal contest structure, there
should not be a sub-contest with more than one prize. Recall that when the prizes are
identical, the loser-elimination mechanism and the simultaneous mechanism yield the ex-
actly same outcome.4 This implies that when the prizes are identical, the optimal structure
characterized in Proposition 2–that is, the symmetric allocation of prizes and players into
K = min {K, N/2} contests–is also optimal when the loser-elimination mechanism is im-
plemented.
2.3 Comparison with sequential winner-selection mechanism
The results above contrast sharply with the result of Fu and Lu (2009) who employs the
sequential winner-selection mechanism a` la Clark and Riis (1996) for each contest. In this
mechanism, players are selected over multiple rounds of contests as in the sequential loser-
elimination mechanism, but instead of a loser is selected out in each round, a winner is
selected in.
Formally, the probability that player i is selected in the kth draw is:
P SQik (x) =
∑
∀Ωk
[Pr (Ωk) I (i ∈ Ωk) pi(x|Ωk)]
where Ωk is again a set of ng − (k − 1) players, Pr (Ωk) is the probability that the set of
the remaining contestants for the kth draw is Ωk, I (i ∈ Ωk) is the indicator function that
takes value 1 if i ∈ Ωk and 0 otherwise, and pi(x|Ωk) = xi/
∑
j∈Ωk xj. And, the probability
that player i wins a prize is P SQi (x) =
∑
k P
SQ
ik (x). It can be shown that in the symmetric
equilibrium, this mechanism elicits eﬀort as much as
xSQi (ng,vg) =
1
ng
kg∑
k=1
[
vgk
(
1−
k−1∑
l=0
1
ng − l
)]
. (4)
4See PSMi (xi, x−i) and P
LE
i (xi, x−i) above. For details, see Chowdhury and Kim (2014).
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Suppose, as before, there are four players (N = 4) competing for two diﬀerent prizes, 1
and 2 (K = 2), with values v1 ≥ v2. As shown above, the maximized total eﬀort with two
small contests is
T small = max
{
v1 + v2
2
,
3
4
v1
}
.
If all the prizes and the players are put in one grand contest and the simultaneous winner-
selection mechanism is implemented, then according to (2) the total equilibrium eﬀort is
T SM =
v (N −K)
N
=
v1 + v2
4
,
and if the sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented, according to (3) the total
eﬀort is
TLE = v1 − v1 + v2
N
=
3v1 − v2
4
.
On the other hand, when the sequential winner-selection mechanism is implemented, then
according to (4) the total eﬀort is
T SQ = v1
(
1− 1
4
)
+ v2
(
1− 1
4
− 1
3
)
=
3v1
4
+
5v2
12
.
This example clearly shows that T SQ > T small > TLE > T SM .5
3 Further analysis: limit in the number of contests
Thus far, we have assumed that there is no additional cost for the designer to organize
more contests, and showed that dividing a grand contest into smaller ones can increase the
total eﬀort. Let us now suppose that there exist operational costs for running these contests,
which increases in the number of groups. Because of the costs, one cannot run more than two
contests, i.e., M ≤ 2.6 Furthermore, suppose that the designer must not waste any prize even
though doing so may increase the total elicited eﬀort.7 This requirement is comparable to
5The result illustrated by this example can be easily generalized. See the discussion in Section 4.
6One may generalize this with a generic convex cost function that considers the number of contests. But,
to provide a simple and clear example, here we consider the case in which the cost is zero for up to two
contests and then it becomes inﬁnity.
7If the designer can throw away prizes, only one prize will be used in each sub-contest in the optimal
structure.
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the budget balance requirement in the mechanism design literature. An interesting question
is what the optimal contest structure looks like when these constraints are imposed. In
the following analysis, for the sake of simplicity we assume that the prizes are identical
(v1 = v2 = ... = vK = v), in which case the sequential loser-elimination mechanism is
best-response equivalent to the simultaneous winner selection mechanism.
The following proposition, ignoring the integer problem, characterizes the optimal contest
structure given the cost constraint.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or the sequential
loser-elimination mechanism is employed. Furthermore, suppose that M cannot be greater
than 2 and that any prize must not be wasted. Then the total eﬀort is maximized by C such
that k∗1 = 1, k
∗
2 = K − 1,
n∗1 =
⎧⎨
⎩
N(
√
K−1−1)
K−2 if K > 2
N/2 if K = 2
,
and n∗2 = N − n∗1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose n1 ≤ N/2. Because the prizes are identical, the
total eﬀort can be written as
n1x1 + n2x2 = v
[
n1 − k1
n1
+
n2 − k2
n2
]
.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, throwing away a player never increases the total
eﬀort. Thus, n1 + n2 = N . And due to the no-waste requirement, k1 + k2 = K. Therefore,
we obtain the following.
n1x1 + n2x2
v
=
n1 − k1
n1
+
N − n1 −K + k1
N − n1
=
2n1(N − n1)− n1K − k1(N − 2n1)
n1(N − n1)
Notice that n1x1+n2x2 is maximized when k1 is the minimized because N ≥ 2n1. Therefore
k∗1 = 1. Given k
∗
1 = 1, the expression is maximized at n
∗
1 = N
(√
K − 1− 1) /(K − 2) which
satisﬁes the assumption that n1 ≤ N/2 and converges to N/2 when K goes to 2.
This proposition shows that if the number of contests cannot be as big as the number
of prizes and no prize can be wasted, the total eﬀort can be maximized by an asymmetric
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contest structure. Observe that N
(√
K − 1− 1) /(K−2) is larger than N/K, meaning that
whenK > 2, only a single prize is allocated to group 1, but there are disproportionately many
contestants in the group. So, in the optimal structure, two small contests are organized. In
one of these contests players face a ﬁerce competition, while in the other, players compete
in a more relaxed manner.
4 Discussion
In this study we reconsider the design of multi-winner contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a
sequential winner-selection mechanism (Clark and Riis, 1996) and ﬁnd that a grand contest
always elicits higher equilibrium eﬀort than a collection of sub-contests. We show that
the result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection or a sequential loser-
elimination mechanism is implemented. This result is obtained because the simultaneous
winner-selection mechanism (Berry, 1993) and the sequential loser-elimination mechanism
(Chowdhury and Kim, 2014) suﬀer with the issue of free-riding. Free-riding is not a problem
in the sequential winner-selection that is implemented in the analysis of Fu and Lu (2009)
since winners are selected in each sequence depending on the amount of eﬀort they spent in
the start.
In the simultaneous winner-selection mechanism, however, winners are selected in com-
binations. A player’s winning probability is the sum of eﬀort of all k-players group that he
is in, as a ratio of the sum of the eﬀorts of all possible k-players group. Hence, it is possible
that a player does not exert any eﬀort, but wins a prize when a combination of k-players,
that includes him, gets selected. Due to this possibility, it is optimal for the players to exert
less eﬀort than in the sequential winner-selection mechanism.
In the sequential loser-elimination mechanism, the logic for free-riding similar to the
simultaneous winner selection mechanism also applies. In each sequence of loser-elimination
a combination of survivors are selected using the Berry (1993) mechanism, until only k
survivors are left to be awarded prizes. Hence, again it is possible for a player not to exert
any eﬀort but still get selected for a prize when the combinations of players, to which he is
included, are selected as survivors in each sequence. As a result, it is again optimal for the
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players to free-ride on each other and exert less eﬀort than they would have exerted under
the sequential winner-selection mechanism.
An increase in the number of prizes increases the eﬀort exerted in the sequential winner-
selection mechanism, and this leads to the “beauty of bigness” result of Fu and Lu (2009).
However, in both the simultaneous winner-selection and the sequential loser-elimination
mechanisms the free-riding opportunity also increases when the number of prizes increases.
Moreover, in both Berry’s and Chowdhury and Kim’s mechanisms, the marginal eﬀort of
the “last” player is greater when the number of contestants is smaller. This is because, as in
most contest mechanisms, the probability that an individual wins a prize is more sensitive
to an individual’s eﬀort when the number of players is smaller. So, in the grand contest in
which the number of prizes and the number of players both are maximized, players exert
less eﬀort than in a collection of sub-contests under the simultaneous winner-selection or the
sequential loser-elimination mechanisms.
These results are of importance for several reasons. First, they show that the optimal
design of a multi-winner contest depends crucially on the type of winner-selection mechanism.
Hence, depending on the objective of the designer, a combination of a winner-selection
mechanism and a grand or sub contest should be employed.
Furthermore, under symmetric prize values, Clark and Riis (1996) show that the equi-
librium eﬀort exerted under the sequential winner-selection mechanism is (weakly) greater
than the equilibrium eﬀort exerted under the simultaneous winner-selection mechanism.
Hence, the sum of equilibrium eﬀort exerted in the sub-contests with the sequential winner-
selection mechanism is greater than or equal to the sum of equilibrium eﬀort exerted in
the sub-contests with the simultaneous winner-selection mechanism. Moreover, Fu and Lu
(2009) show that for the sequential winner-selection mechanism, the equilibrium eﬀort ex-
erted in the grand contest is strictly greater than the sum of equilibrium eﬀort exerted in
the sub-contests. Finally, the current study shows that for the simultaneous winner-selection
mechanism, the sum of equilibrium eﬀort exerted in the sub-contests is strictly greater than
the equilibrium eﬀort exerted in the grand contest. Combining these, we get a clear ranking
among the diﬀerent mechanism as follows: Grand contest with sequential winner selection
> Collection of sub-contests with sequential winner-selection ≥ Collection of sub-contests
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with simultaneous winner-selection > Grand contest with simultaneous winner-selection.8
If a contest designer faces an unconstrained choice of which mechanism to be employed,
this ranking clearly shows that running a grand contest with sequential winner selection
mechanism would be preferred - triumphing the ‘Beauty of Bigness’. In the ﬁeld, however,
a simultaneous mechanism might already be in place and would be costly to replace. The
current study prescribes that in such a case it is preferred to implement a collection of small
sub-contests, as in terms of total equilibrium eﬀort, they are ‘Small, yet Beautiful’.
Moreover, this study also indicates that if it is possible to employ the loser-elimination
mechanism, then it might elicit more eﬀort than the simultaneous winner-selection mecha-
nism, and can be a compromise if a sequential winner-selection mechanism cannot be em-
ployed.
Finally, it is well known that in the collective rent-seeking contests (a` la Nitzan, 1991),
a part of the prize is allocated according to the eﬀort outlays and the rest is allocated
randomly. Since that is also the case for both the simultaneous winner-selection and the
sequential loser-elimination mechanisms multi-winner contests, the current result indicates
that in such collective contests it might be possible to elicit higher eﬀort by splitting the
prize from a grand prize into several small prizes.
8Here, “simultaneous winner-selection” can be replaced by “sequential loser-elimination”. Moreover, it
can be easily shown that given a sub-contest, the sequential loser-elimination mechanism is weakly preferred
to the simultaneous mechanism. What is unclear is whether the grand contest with the sequential loser-
elimination elicits a greater total eﬀort than a collection of sub-contests with the simultaneous mechanism.
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